The conditions for a Chinese attack on Taiwan are perilously close to being fulfilled. A period of intense danger may begin as early as the second half of 2018.
Three conditions need to be fulfilled before China can give serious consideration to attacking Taiwan. To begin with China’s leaders must be convinced that the window has closed on using persuasion to bring the island under its control — that military action, rather than politics, is the only way to achieve unification. At the same time China must be convinced that it has the military means to mount a successful invasion across the Taiwan Strait, and that it can subdue whatever Taiwanese opposition develops in the invasion’s wake. Finally China must be convinced that the international fallout from its invasion would not be so catastrophic as to call into question the gains it achieves from completing what it clearly sees as a sacred historical mission.
Now, in the summer of 2017, China appears to be perilously to fulfilling all these conditions.
The political option for unification
Start with the waning of the political option for unification. With the election of Ma Ying-jeou as Taiwanese president in 2008, China believed that a framework had finally been put into place to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully. Ma’s Nationalist Party was fully committed to achieving economic convergence between the sides, and when, early in his first term, Ma starting talking about the two parties to the Chinese civil war signing a peace treaty, it looked like the ultimate prize, the prize of political convergence, was no longer a question of if, but rather one of when.
By 2013 however, clear signs began to emerge that China’s peaceful unification option was running into trouble. To begin with, negative political fallout had forced Ma to unceremoniously abandon his peace treaty idea in the midst of his 2012 re-election campaign, underscoring the Taiwan public’s longstanding opposition to unifying with China on Chinese terms. At the same time, Taiwanese skeptics began asking hard questions about Ma’s economic convergence plan, fearing that it was essentially a sop for well-connected Taiwanese companies operating in China, and that average Taiwanese would gain little or nothing from it.
Skepticism about Ma’s China outreach program reached a crescendo in March of 2014 when Taiwanese students and others occupied the Taiwanese legislature to protest a new Sino-Taiwanese trade pact. There is a clear line between these demonstrations and the humiliating defeat suffered by Ma’s Kuomintang (KMT) in the presidential and legislative elections of 2016. More than anything else the elections showed that the Taiwanese public was not prepared to accept political unification with China, or for that matter, a substantial degree of economic convergence between the sides. Though it may not have been clear at the time, this marked the beginning of the end of China’s longstanding strategy of using the Nationalist Party to achieve its goal of bringing about national unity by peaceful means.
Since the 2016 elections, prospects for China’s peaceful unification strategy have deteriorated even further. Hung Hsiu-chu, China’s favored candidate to lead the Nationalist Party in the post Ma era, garnered less than 20 percent of the votes in the party’s chairmanship race. She was soundly defeated by Wu Den-yih, a colorless apparatchik, who whatever else one may say about him, is unlikely to implement the kind of wide-ranging political convergence program that earlier eluded Ma Ying-jeou and which remains the sine qua non for peaceful unification. Even more to the point, the chances of someone like Wu ever being elected Taiwanese president seem increasingly remote. This reflects a deepening of Taiwanese (as opposed to Chinese) political identity among Taiwanese voters. It also reflects growing Taiwanese disdain for Chinese political values (fanned, among other things, by China’s take-no-prisoners approach to Hong Kong governance) and the relative moderation demonstrated by current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, who has definitively put to rest the notion that non-Nationalist Party leaders on Taiwan are temperamentally incapable of running the island-nation’s affairs.
For any fact-based Chinese leadership, the conclusion from all of this is that in the absence of some sort of wholly unexpected political development, the peaceful option for unification with Taiwan is now off the table. China may want to wait until the 2020 Taiwanese elections to test this conclusion definitively, but at least for the time being, it shouldn’t have any doubts.
Military superiority
Few military operations are more difficult to bring off than amphibious invasions. They require formidable coordination among land, sea and aerial forces. The conventional wisdom is that China is probably still three or four years away from being able to bring a successful invasion of Taiwan off — this despite Beijing’s massive defense outlays over the past 20 years, its major emphasis on Taiwan invasion preparation, and its new efforts to enhance inter-service coordination. Analysts say the People’s Liberation Army Navy still lacks the required lift capacity and aerial defense capability to mount a successful invasion of Taiwan. They also say that chances for an early invasion are compromised by conspicuous land force deficiencies, including an insufficient number of helicopters, paratroopers, special operators and amphibious mechanized units.
A major factor in Chinese invasion planning is the readiness of the Taiwanese forces. Here the news for China is quite encouraging. Taiwan’s ambitious plan to transition from a conscripted to an all-volunteer force has long since foundered on the shoals of widespread anti-military feeling within Taiwanese society (to a considerable extent reflecting the baleful history of the Taiwan Garrison Command and the off-putting rigidity of the Taiwanese officer class) and the almost supernatural ability of millions and millions of Taiwanese to ignore the existential threat they are facing from a longstanding adversary, which again and again has warned them that it means to take them over. The major blame for this probably lies with the Taiwanese media, which would rather deal with celebrity scandals and other prurient click bait than the real