Chiang Kai-shek once wrote that the biggest reason for the KMT’s defeat in China was that it had never been able to establish a new, solid organizational type of system. The same seems to be happening again as the party struggles to find its footing after a disastrous election in 2016.
Writing in his diary about internal party reform on Jan. 3, 1950, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) observed that one should “particularly stress the importance of the party as a new organization, with new party outlines, new appeals, and new tasks so that the reformed party would be able to attract new party members.”[1] Already Chiang recognized the abject failure of his regime in not just battling the communists with arms but also in engaging with the people it sought to rule. In restructuring the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), party leaders were able to build an organization that was efficient in adapting and disseminating its ideology among a population that differed quite radically from the party.
Rigger[2] has correctly identified that understanding ideology is critical in identifying and analyzing political actors’ actions, particularly when those actions appear to be unreasoned or self-defeating. Two such examples are provided by the KMT, which faces two crises that are fundamentally linked to each other: identity and electoral viability.
The crushing loss of both the presidency and control of the Legislative Yuan in the January 2016 elections left the KMT with a leadership void that has since been filled by the controversial Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱). Hung, along with several other party members who are considered “deep-blue,” have seemingly caused such a rift within the party that its electoral prospects going forward seem dim, particularly at the national level.
Of particular concern is Hung’s China policy and views regarding the “1992 consensus” (九二共識), specifically her apparent attempt to erode the established orthodox Taiwanese understanding of the term “one China, different interpretations” (一中各表). Even more disquieting is the new leadership’s willingness to silence, and even purge, younger and more localized voices within the party, such as Yang Wei-chung (楊偉中), and thereby stifling much needed internal reform.
We can ask to what extent the “1992 consensus” is still simply a piece of political jargon created for primarily political reasons, or perhaps to what extent it has become so inextricably linked to KMT ideology that it threatens the party’s long-term electoral competitiveness, inhibiting wider party reform and insulating the old guard and “deep-blue” members from political reality. Lastly, we can also wonder whether fixation on the rhetorical relationship with China has distracted the party from critical reforms needed to revitalize its electoral prospects.
History of the 1992 Consensus
The so-called “1992 consensus” is by design deliberately ambiguous and, despite claims to the contrary, has no clear definition that has been unanimously accepted, or observed, by both sides of the Taiwan Strait, whose interpretations can be found here for Taiwan and here for China. China in particular frequently plays down or rejects the existence of the “different interpretations” (各自表述).[3] It is also perhaps useful to note that some senior figures in government at the time deny that a consensus was even reached.
It is possible to interpret the “1992 consensus” as a political solution to reconcile ideological rifts between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party,[4] as well as a possible attempt to constrain Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) following his election in 2000, which incidentally is when the term first rose to prominence by way of Su Chi (蘇起). The year 2000 was also the first time China embraced and used this terminology in state media via the Xinhua News Agency.[5]
Nevertheless, regardless of the actual date on which the “1992 consensus” was formulated, upon his election in 2008 Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) officially adopted it as his administration’s political framework for working with China. Thus, arguments over whether a consensus was reached in 1992 or not is arguably largely irrelevant to the current political landscape; the “1992 consensus” could just as well have been called the “2008 consensus.”
Of course, there is still the question of the exact meaning of the phrase – though realistically, given Beijing’s rejection of both Chen’s “1992 Spirit” and President Tsai Ing-wen’s “the fact of the 1992 talks between the two institutions representing each side across the Strait” (1992年兩岸兩會會談的歷史事實), for China the “1992 consensus” is essentially a euphemism for the “one China” principle (一個中國原則), which is in conflict with even the KMT’s official position.
Taiwan now finds itself, arguably as a result of KMT political posturing, in a situation where many important economic ties have been linked to the concept of the “1992 consensus.” Thus, what was once a term linked almost exclusively to ideology and a statement of partisan intent has now been expanded and spilled into the realm of general, everyday politics. This phenomenon is both domestic and international, with KMT officials and legislators claiming that without accepting this fundamental ideology Taiwan cannot proposer, as well as it coming to be framed by China as a “bottom line” for any exchanges, even those that are apolitical in nature.
Need for Reform
One of the key reasons the KMT was able to successfully consolidate its power over Taiwan was due to the reforms initiated by Chiang between 1950 and 1952. Key facets of this reform included older party veterans being given largely ceremonial roles in favor of younger, highly educated technocrats, as opposed to ideologues. In addition, recruitment of new talent was of immense importance, and by 1952 educated youth comprised approximately 40% of provincial party members.[6] Moreover, in order to boost legitimacy, raising the living standards of ordinary people was a high priority. This stands in sharp contrast with the current situation of the party, which seems increasingly drawn into ideological debates and has pursued an economic relationship with China that has not generated a more even distribution of wealth in Taiwan.
The enormous defeat in the 2016 elections, which many analysts have concluded was won primarily on the basis of domestic issues, has plunged the KMT into a serious and ongoing debate about the party’s relationship with China. So deep has this ideological rift been that even the most basic of party platforms — the “1992 consensus” — has been called into question, with a seeming lack of clarity even within the party over what it stands for.
This has even led to public spats between Chairperson Hung and other senior party members – including former president Ma. This ideological drive by nominally “deep-blue” party members to revise, reinterpret, or even “deepen” the “1992 consensus” is not only deeply unpopular with the electorate, but actively distracts the party from repositioning itself so it can contend in future elections as a legitimate alternative or even to act as a robust opposition.
In a somewhat self-defeating manner, the KMT has pledged to act as a bridge of communication between China and Taiwan, with seeming total disregard for the democratic and institutional processes that ensure that the will of the Taiwanese people is expressed. More worryingly still for the party is the message that this sends to the electorate: Is the KMT’s only function being able to communicate with China? In light of the fact that elections increasingly focus on domestic issues, this does not seem to be a platform that, on its own, will resonate with voters.
The KMT appears to have become a single-issue party, its pro-China stance the single identifier of its role — and even in this position it is somewhat vague. The electoral success of the New Power Party, as well as the emergence of other parties such as the Social Democratic Party in the 2016 elections demonstrates that there is a healthy demand for parties that campaign primarily on a platform of domestic social policies.
With the abject failure of the KMT establishment, there was a unique opportunity to “clean house” and place fresh talent in key decisionmaking positions vital to maintaining the support of its voter base. This need not necessarily exclude supporting a more China-leaning foreign policy, but a rebalance in terms of overall policy focus. Tsai learned this lesson when she readjusted her “Taiwan consensus” (台灣共識) following her electoral defeat in 2012.
This trend of overreliance, and veneration, of certain conservative figures within the KMT does not seem to be abating. Despite the extremely unhelpful, with regards to the party’s image, election of Hung as party chair, it seems that the party is looking to replace her with equally uninspiring party veterans, such as Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) or possibly even Ma, in the 2017 party chairman election.
The Trump Factor
Donald Trump, soon to be inaugurated 45th president of the United States, accepted a phone call from President Tsai on Dec. 2. In addition to this unprecedented move, and perhaps more importantly, he told an interview on Dec. 11suggesting that the U.S. may not remain bound to a “One China” policy (一中政策). For better or worse, while such a foreign policy shift could be momentous in terms of international repercussions, its prospect also poses a significant challenge for the KMT and its endorsement of the “1992 consensus.”
The party has long touted the fact that the consensus — effectively “one China” — is the reason for the continued “peace” across the Strait, not least because both the U.S. and China have reached some form of understanding on the matter. If the U.S., Taiwan’s most important security partner, no longer overtly endorsed this position, it would severely undermine the claim that “peace” is dependent on the acceptance of “one China.”
Moreover, due to Beijing’s refusing to explicitly, or even ambiguously, endorse the “different interpretations” aspects of the consensus, the KMT finds itself in a position where neither China’s nor the U.S.’s policy aligns with its own. It cannot embrace China’s understanding, as this would undoubtedly result in electoral catastrophe graver even than in 2016, and it seems unlikely to abandon its own version of “one China,” as the “1992 consensus” is currently its only defining feature.
The “1992 consensus” once was a boon for the KMT; it allowed it to reconcile ideological differences with its former foe in China, assume the appearance of stability, and frame its main political opponent, the Democratic Progressive Party, as incompetent. However, it has now become problematic, so much so that it is now having a sizeable impact on the party’s ability to recalibrate itself to the new political landscape in Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 lamented the party’s defeat in China, stating that, “The biggest reason for our defeat was that we had never been able to establish a new, solid organizational type of system. The old one had long deteriorated and collapsed.”[7] For the KMT, such words seem to ring true once again.
[1] Myers, R. H. (2009) Towards an Enlightened Authoritarian Polity: the Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-1952. Journal of Contemporary China, 18(59) 185-199.
[2] Rigger, S. (2016) Party Ideology. In: Schubert, G. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. London: Routledge, 104-118.
[3] Wu, J. M. (2016) The China Factor In Taiwan. In: Schubert, G. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. London: Routledge, 426-446.
[4] Wei, C. H. (2015) Producing and Reproducing the 1992 Consensus: The Sociolinguistic Construction of the Political Economy of China-Taiwan Relations. Asian Security, 11(1) 72-88.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Myers, R. H. (2009) Towards an Enlightened Authoritarian Polity: the Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-1952. Journal of Contemporary China, 18(59) 185-199.
[7] Ibid.
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