Thinking Strategically About Taiwan’s Survival

As it faces off against an increasingly assertive China, Taiwan must do everything it can to present a united front that is committed to the maintenance of its democratic institutions.

It is often said about Taiwan that its best asset is its democracy, which acts both as a firewall against authoritarian China’s encroachment and an instrument of soft power to appeal to an oftentimes inattentive international community. More than ever, as Beijing intensifies its efforts to undermine the island-nation’s democratic institutions and public support for them, Taiwanese and their allies must determine the best responses to this challenge and avoid short-sighted policies that can have the inadvertent effect of assisting Beijing.

What to defend?

As we know, democracy is not static, but rather something that needs to be cultivated and strengthened, and which under certain circumstances can even backslide. The healthier a democracy, the better it can insulate a polity against sudden shifts in policy or the adoption of policies that go against the interests of the majority (e.g., unilateral moves that risk endangering a country’s sovereignty). Moreover, regular elections, which are only one aspect of democracy, give the people the ability to vote out underperforming governments or to remove from office officials whose policies are no longer aligned with the wishes of the majority.

As to soft power, the true value of democracy for Taiwan isn’t democracy itself — after all, democracy is only a tool by which to arrive at policy decisions — but rather what its peaceful adoption, after decades of authoritarian rule, says about the people of Taiwan and how they choose to resolve differences. To argue that Taiwan ought to be defended because it is a democracy not only is a cliché, it also creates dangerous assumptions about international will. If the international community is to help Taiwan, it will do so to help its people and what they stand for, not because of a particular system of governance.

It is also important to point out that this evolution (or revolution) was accomplished by all Taiwanese, whether they be “green” or “blue,” and is therefore a unifying, though often unacknowledged, factor in Taiwanese politics. The two camps have agreed to participate in Taiwan’s democratic experiment and overall have submitted to the rules of the game. When they fail to do so, electoral retribution imposes a necessary corrective.

China’s assault

Frustrated in its efforts to win over and/or to coerce the Taiwanese, China is now set on breaking that unifying bond and to undermine the democratic practices that serve as Taiwan’s firewall. Although such efforts have always been part of Beijing’s strategy against Taiwan, the use of United Front tactics, political warfare, propaganda, attacks on journalists, co-optation, fifth columns, disinformation and “fake news” has undoubtedly accelerated in recent years. The first uptick occurred early in President Ma Ying-jeou’s second term, when it became clear to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that Ma’s Kuomintang (KMT) could not, due to the democratic pressures discussed earlier, deliver what it wanted (the Sunflower Movement of 2014 then sealed the deal). The municipal elections of November 2014, followed by the presidential and legislative elections of January 2016, made it clear that the blue camp was on the out and that a more Taiwan-centric Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was again in ascendancy. As a result, once President Tsai Ing-wen entered office in May 2016, CCP efforts to bypass and undermine Taiwan’s official institutions — and thereby its democracy — underwent a second round of intensification.

It is important to note that China’s campaign against Taiwan’s democratic institutions did not begin with the Tsai administration, or that a KMT administration would result in the cessation of such activities. No matter which party holds office in Taiwan, the democratic rules of the game ensure that no government can deliver what authoritarian China wants. The CCP’s best bet, then, isn’t to rely on alliances with political parties in Taiwan, but to bypass them while corrupting democratic institutions and belief therein. In other words, to breach the democratic firewall. Today’s international context, with a self-assured China and dispirited West, means that the threat to Taiwan’s democracy is manifestly greater than it was under presidents Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and Ma Ying-jeou.

The external environment that President Tsai faces today is indeed a very difficult one, and therefore efforts to defend and consolidate Taiwan’s firewall have become all the more important. While the military threat against Taiwan certainly isn’t negligible, too great a focus on that single aspect of cross-Strait relations threatens to draw attention away from the more immediate threat that the CCP poses to Taiwanese society.

Defending the realm

Given all this, Taiwanese of every political persuasion (with the exception, perhaps, of the marginal pro-unification groups) should see the wisdom of unity. There is no better protection against China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s institutions than a Taiwanese United Front. Unfortunately, disunity often characterizes the Taiwanese political environment and does so even as China’s assault on Taiwan intensifies. While scorched-earth party politics pitting “blue” against “green” at the Legislative Yuan certainly contributes to that disunity (that is what politicians do for short-term electoral gain), the real problem is a more fundamental one that stems from a stubborn belief in the irreconcilability of the two camps.

To this day, mistrust continues to poison relations between the blue and green camp within society, in the workplace and in government, as does a belief in “ethnicity” pitting waishengren (“Mainlander”) against benshengren (“native Taiwanese”) and Indigenous peoples. An understandable legacy of Chinese colonialism in Taiwan after World War II, this ethnic-based view of citizenship is as antiquated as it is destructive, failing to account for the increasingly multiethnic and civic aspects of Taiwanese nationalism. By focusing on differences and sustaining notions of an untrusted “Other” (which also applies to entire state institutions, e.g., the foreign service), Taiwanese tend to neglect the many overlapping interests and values that inform their polity and reinforce Taiwan’s firewall. Although younger generations of Taiwanese are less likely to hold such views, their lingering effects within society and government continue to prevent the kind of coming together that will be necessary for Taiwan to present a true United Front. Rather than focus on the differences that divide, Taiwanese in both camps should recognize the many things they have in common (this is something that has always struck me as obvious but which for some reason seems to elude many a Taiwanese). A belief in a liberal-democratic way of life is the very foundation of that commonality, one that is held by both supporters of the green and blue camp (it was very telling when supporters of Hung Hsiu-chu, the initial KMT candidate in the 2016 elections, who were protesting outside KMT headquarters in late 2015 after the party sidelined Hung in favor of Eric Chu told me they thought it was undemocratic of the party to remove her at the eleventh hour and that in their view Hung was the best person to defend democracy. Whether Hung indeed was such a person is debatable; what is striking, however, is that even deep blue supporters were using the democratic language).

Supporters of Hung Hsiu-chu, the initial KMT candidate in the 2016 elections, protest outside KMT headquarters in late 2015 after the party sidelined Hung in favor of Eric Chu. Several participants told the author that the move was undemocratic and that Hung was the best candidate to defend the country against China (Photo: J. Michael Cole)

Just as worrying are the divisions that now exist within the green camp and which are forcing the Tsai administration to fight rear battles at a time when its energies should be focused on meeting the challenges posed by her blue opponents, China, and a difficult external environment. Among other things, deeper-green elements in the DPP and other smaller parties have accused President Tsai of several things, including appointing so-called “blue” and “Mainlander” technocrats to her Cabinet (e.g., Foreign Minister David Lee and Premier Lin Chuan), being too soft on China, and of dragging her feet on Taiwan’s sovereignty (e.g., seeking membership for Taiwan at the UN, rectifying referendum laws, or declaring de jure independence rather than maintain the “status quo” under the Republic of China constitutional framework). For those groups, President Tsai’s refusal to acknowledge the so-called “1992 consensus” and her commitment to maintaining the “status quo” is insufficient; worse, it signals a lack of leadership and strategy.

While such views certainly are not shared by a majority, that impatience has been growing and is being cultivated by certain groups and media (e.g., FTV) that are now keen on making Tsai a one-term president and to support an alternative candidate (presumably Tainan Mayor William Lai) in the 2020 elections. Sustained by lack of political experience and their own disinformation, those groups, opinion makers and loud demagogues argue that President Tsai has accomplished nothing, that she has been slow in the delivery of promised reform and that, worse, she is unwilling to stand up to China. Ultimately, for those groups nothing good can happen until Taiwan has declared formal independence.

This isn’t about President Tsai or the DPP; this is about being intelligent in the face of extreme odds, of thinking strategically when confronted with an existential threat.

In reality, the Tsai administration has so far succeeded in holding the line on its principles while ensuring a modicum of stability in both cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s relations with other states in times of high uncertainty, particularly that resulting from the emergence of Donald Trump as U.S. president (her government has had to navigate both the tail end of the Democratic Obama administration and the bumpy transition to a Republican-led and somewhat unorthodox government under Trump). Critics of President Tsai in the green camp fail to understand that moves toward a declaration of independence at this time would be the surest way of alienating Taiwan’s longstanding ally, not to mention that given the current international context, no country is likely to recognize a Republic of Taiwan lest this derail their relations with Beijing. The same critics also fail to realize that adopting an openly belligerent posture against China over issues such as the theft of diplomatic allies or the kidnapping in March this year of Lee Ming-che would not gain Taiwan anything (except fleeting satisfaction) while ensuring that the hardliners in the CCP, who themselves have criticized President Xi Jinping for not punishing Taiwan hard enough, have the ammunition they need to crack down on Taiwan. When the critics claim that the Tsai administration has done nothing on those fronts, they do so without having all the information at hand; they would do well to understand that much of what takes place in diplomacy does so beyond the view of the public. They also seem to forget that President Tsai was the only world leader to issue a strong statement following the death of Chinese Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo last month.

None of this is to argue that President Tsai should not be held accountable. After all, demanding good leadership from our government is the very essence of democracy. Be that as it may, her critics in the green camp should nevertheless realize that reform takes time and that governments — especially those that operate in a democracy — are inherently slow at implementing policy; not everything can happen at once, and certainly not in the first year of a new administration.

Supporters of Tsai Ing-wen take part in a rally the night before the 2016 elections (Photo: J. Michael Cole)

They should also realize that defending Taiwan and its democracy requires a strategic outlook and deep understanding of the global context in which policy decisions are made. Nothing would be gained from adopting policies that would further isolate Taiwan, as a declaration of independence most assuredly would. Moreover, the belief that such assertiveness would help Taiwan ignores the fact that the leadership operates in a democracy and that it must perforce adopt policies that reflect the wishes of the majority. Failing to do so, the Tsai administration would be signing its death warrant in the next elections, just as Ma’s KMT did in the lead-up to 2016. Not to mention that going against the wishes of the majority would be autocratic and break the rules of the democratic game.

In a vacuum, politicians can make all kinds of claims. But the real test occurs when they need to collect votes. At this juncture, the policies proposed by Tsai’s critics in the green camp are about just as appealing as those embraced by the pro-unification camp: a dead end. And without getting elected, would-be politicians will never be in a position to create policy; that is the fundamental rule in a democracy.

Thus far President Tsai has held firm on the red lines for which she still receives support from the majority, and is buying time so Taiwan can further consolidate its institutions at home. Her ability to continue doing so will depend on the green base remaining solidly behind her and on the continuation of policies that do not unduly alienate blue voters. President Tsai needs as united a front as possible, which means aiming for the middle ground, as she has done so far. Given the immense challenges ahead, the more extreme elements within the green camp (the extreme blue is irreparably out of touch) had better recognize that disunity, which will force President Tsai to fight rear battles while simultaneously warding off China, is the surest way to defeat for all, as only the CCP will benefit from this. Rather than amplify deep-green views, overseas Taiwanese groups, meanwhile, should use their geographical advantage to shape perceptions of Taiwan by lobbying their local officials. Groups blue and green need to put their impatience aside and seriously think about the best ways to ensure survival for Taiwan. Hurting their president with false claims, encouraging factionalism and appealing to extremes that have no future electorally, not to mention efforts to sabotage her administration, is not only short-sighted: it derails democracy and puts the very future of this country at risk.

This isn’t about President Tsai or the DPP; this is about being intelligent in the face of extreme odds, of thinking strategically when confronted with an existential threat.

This article is adapted from a talk given by the author at the 37th North America Taiwanese Professors’ Association Annual Conference in Chicago on Aug. 5, 2017. Photo courtesy of the official Tsai Ing-wen Facebook page.

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