China’s Self-Defeating Approach to Taiwan

By closing all options for negotiations with Taipei, Beijing has sunk into strategic deadlock and strengthened Taiwan’s national identity and unity. It is once again a driving force for Taiwan’s quest for emancipation.

Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office last year, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government has adopted a moderate tone toward China, while trying to keep its influence at bay. However, Beijing has grown impatient and stepped up its saber-rattling, generating incomprehension and resentment across Taiwan.

This coercion is ostensibly caused by the Chinese leadership’s tacit recognition that its policy of economic rapprochement and other attempts to win the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese have failed. Early this year, opinion polls showed that 78% of Taiwanese between the age of 20 and 29 identified themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, a view that is shared by 60% of Taiwan’s total population.

Close but so far away

During the eight years of Kuomintang (KMT) rule under Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016), most people in Taiwan seemed to be in favor of some sort of rapprochement with China, resulting in the passing of several bilateral agreements. As this happened, China’s economic attraction gained momentum and more Taiwanese graduates are now tempted to pursue a career on the continent.

And yet, these developments did not affect the strengthening of Taiwan’s national identity: Taiwanese favor the continuation of Taiwan’s de facto independence from China, and public support for unification has dropped to single-digit territory. Public discontent with the manner in which president Ma handled his China policy, meanwhile, was highlighted by the high frequency of civic activism, including the Sunflower Movement in 2014.

In the wake of all this, the KMT suffered a historic electoral setback in the 2016 elections, to the benefit of the Taiwan-centric DPP. Since then, the KMT has been unable to offer a credible political alternative to its rival. The political party of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek now faces a dilemma: either it keeps a pro-China tone and compromises its chances in future elections, or, as it appears to be the case today, it finds a middle path which will surely fall short of Beijing’s expectations. The perspective of losing their only credible interlocutor in Taiwan may have led the Chinese to endorse a more aggressive approach.

The impossible dialogue

Beijing’s volte-face has blown away the olive branch extended by Tsai after her electoral victory.

Tsai lost the 2012 elections to Ma with an approach to cross-Strait relations that at the time was considered potentially dangerous vis à vis China. Her adversary, meanwhile, promised an era of détente and economic co-prosperity in the Strait. The Taiwanese remembered the troublesome presidency of Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) as well as the ensuing tensions with China. In the 2016 elections, however, the situation was reversed: the KMT was accused of leaning too close to China, and the economic outcomes of rapprochement were regarded as disappointing. With regards to the China question, it was on the promise of safeguarding the “status quo” — no formal independence, no unification — that Tsai won most ballots. Open to dialogue and committed to avoiding any sensitive declaration, Tsai kept her promise.

Unlike the KMT, the DPP under Tsai does not recognize the “1992 consensus,” a term which refers to a tacit understanding between the KMT and Beijing that both sides acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means. Although Tsai conceded that political talks did occur in 1992 between the two sides, the concession was deemed an “incomplete test paper” by Beijing, which officially made recognition of the consensus a prerequisite for any talks with Taiwan. To demonstrate its discontent, China says it has shut down all communication channels while blaming Taiwan for its supposed inflexibility.

To demonstrate its discontent, China says it has shut down all communication channels while blaming Taiwan for its supposed inflexibility.

Tsai was elected on the promise of peaceful coexistence with China, but not at the cost of political rapprochement or the erosion of Taiwan’s sovereignty. The recognition would betray a few of DPP’s founding principles, and it is unclear whether China would de-escalate if those conditions were fulfilled.

Beijing also finds itself in a deadlock.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has often depicted Taiwan as the final piece of national territory that has not been yet recovered from the “century of humiliation,” with the survival of the ROC acting as an aggravating circumstance. Hence, getting Taiwan under Beijing’s thumb bears a heavy symbolic significance in China — at least to the CCP. Moreover, the fact that Taiwan’s democratic regime acts as an alternative political model in a “Chinese” context is an untenable threat to the legitimacy of the CCP. Due to its one-party rule, China cannot afford to lose face on the Taiwan issue, since failure could challenge the credibility of the regime. Showing weakness on Taiwan could also invigorate separatist movements on the Chinese geographical margins.

Usually, in the case of power struggles within the CCP, party officials seek to demonstrate a high level of patriotism by adopting a firmer stance on Taiwan. Thus, the 19^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China this fall is perhaps another factor explaining why China has stepped up its pressures on Taiwan. During this event, the potential successors of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang may be designated (unless Xi decides to extend his rule). In addition, the Congress takes place in a context of economic strain in China, which creates stronger incentives to deflect public scrutiny toward geopolitical issues, Taiwan among them.

A series of vexations

China has displayed aggressiveness toward Taiwan on several occasions since Tsai’s election, in the form of intimidation tactics and fait accompli. Suspected Taiwanese scammers operating abroad have been deported to China to be tried as Chinese citizens. Earlier this year, the Chinese government asked Emirates Airlines to require Taiwanese crew members swap their Taiwanese pins for Chinese ones to fully comply with the “One China” policy (crew members protested and were subsequently given the possibility of not wearing a pin at all). Lately in Geneva, a group of students and their professor were denied entry at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations. The reason given them was that their Republic of China passport was considered an invalid document for entry.

New efforts have also been made to further limit Taiwan’s international space by targeting the unofficial ties it has with other countries. In Nigeria, Taiwan’s representative office was forced to relocate from the capital city to Lagos. Another blow came from the freezing of Taiwan’s participation as an observer at the World Health Assembly (WHA) due to pressure from Beijing. Despite a lukewarm support from Germany, the U.S. and some of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, the Director-General of the WHO, Margaret Chan, toed the line set by Beijing. On French-language online-magazine Asialyst, the head of Taiwan’s representative office in France, temperately recalled that “sanitary issues ignore state boundaries and it is not right that, for political reasons, Taiwan and its 23 million people are absent from this international reunion.” In 2003, Taiwan was severely hit by the SARS outbreak. Its exclusion from the WHO resulted in delays in obtaining crucial information on the virus.

Although a “diplomatic truce” was observed during the Ma years, China has now resumed its offensive against Taiwan’s official diplomatic allies. Gambia, which had cut relations with Taipei in 2013, finally was allowed to establish relations with China soon after Tsai’s election and Sao Tomé and Principe followed in December. Recently, Panama, one of Taiwan’s longstanding allies, also embraced Beijing. The picture of Panama’s Vice President Isabel de Saint Malo and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi sipping a glass of champagne made a strong impression. The decision upset and saddened Taiwan, but it was hardly a surprise. Taiwanese officials acknowledge that the country cannot afford to engage in checkbook diplomacy and that the current leakage will be difficult to plug. Still, some analysts in Taiwan have downplayed the importance of losing official diplomatic allies and see benefits in ending costly parasitical relations with those allies. It is often heard in Taiwan that the consolidation of unofficial links with Japan, Southeast Asia and other major democracies is more important for enhancing Taiwan’s international profile.

President Tsai is under pressure from Beijing, but so far the public continues to support her approach to cross-Strait relations (photo courtesy of the Tsai Ing-wen official Facebook page).

However, setbacks have outnumbered successes recently, and discontent dominates in Taiwan. Taipei can still take advantage of its soft power, which is sometimes presented in the form of a moral case promoting the fully democratic nature of Taiwan’s political regime. Lately, Taiwan has embraced marriage equality and Reporters Without Borders (RSF), which has decided to open its first Asia bureau in Taipei, ranked the country number 1 in Asia for press freedom. The island also seeks to expand cultural and economic ties with the rest of the world.

China’s recurring attacks have nonetheless exasperated the Taiwanese. In March 2017, 80% of them saw China’s attitude as hostile. Even more telling, 90% of Taiwanese currently want the normalization of the country’s diplomatic situation, reflecting a demand for real statehood. Bitterness is replacing placidity in discussions on the matter. As a professor recently told this author: “China can take everything it wants. But with such a policy, it will never make anyone willing to become Chinese.” At government levels, the resentment took the form of less nuanced statements than usual, with Tsai accusing China of endangering peace in the Strait and warning that “we will not compromise under [China’s] threat.” Tsai promised she would “re-evaluate” the cross-Strait situation, perhaps with the acknowledgement that any hope of assuaging China without recognizing the “1992 consensus” is futile.

Toward greater antagonism?

The olive branch extended by Tsai outlined the responsibility of China — not Taiwan — for the growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The moderate image Tsai enjoys now stands in stark contrast with the hostility displayed by China.

Under these conditions, it is surprising that Beijing continues to ignore Taipei’s calls for negotiation and has instead chosen to maintain a bellicose attitude. This harshness highlights both China’s impatience and inability to make Taiwan fall in line. Although Beijing could to a certain point exploit the DPP’s willingness to negotiate, it has shut down the possibility of dialogue and in so doing took the risk of further widening the gap between both sides of the Strait.

Even if it literally besieges Taiwan, China could trap itself in a strategic deadlock by refusing to negotiate. Its actions no doubt strengthen rather than limit the emergence of Taiwan’s national identity and unity, and its behavior is once again a driving force for Taiwan’s quest for emancipation. In addition, this aggressiveness further undermines the credibility of China’s already marginal support in Taiwan, and potential allies in the blue camp are in no position at the moment to influence Beijing’s behavior.

The strengthening of Taiwan’s desire for sovereignty is both a structural trend and a formidable challenge for Beijing. The more pressure China exerts against the island, the deeper the roots of Taiwan’s national consciousness and estrangement from the continent will grow.

The strengthening of Taiwan’s desire for sovereignty is both a structural trend and a formidable challenge for Beijing. The more pressure China exerts against the island, the deeper the roots of Taiwan’s national consciousness and estrangement from the continent will grow.

China already suffered from this 20 years ago, when it tried to coerce the public against voting for the Taiwan-centric Lee Teng-hui in 1996. This experience was repeated prior to the 2016 elections, when the Chinese Internet went ballistic over a 16-year-old Taiwanese K-pop singer seen in a video clip holding a ROC flag. Twice now, the vexations felt in Taiwan have contributed to the election of a China-skeptic government.

This year’s developments seem to indicate that China has once again decided to use intimidation against Taiwan as its principal policy. By doing so, Beijing is jeopardizing its chances of encouraging Taiwan to make any of the concessions it seeks. Things have become such, in fact, that dialogue may no longer be a viable option.

A longer version of this article originally appeared in French on Questions-Chine.net.

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