Chinese Interference in Taiwan’s Elections is Part of a Two-Pronged Attack on Democracy

For the November elections, vote buying is no longer the purely local problem it once was. It is now directly tied to Beijing’s sustained assault on the very legitimacy of Taiwan’s democracy.

The Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) on Monday confirmed long-suspected fears that Beijing has ramped up its efforts to interfere in the nationwide municipal elections next month.

According to MJIB Director-General Leu Wen-jong, the bureau is currently investigating 33 cases of suspected Chinese funding of various candidates in the Nov. 24 elections, with evidence that the money is coming directly from the Chinese government. In most cases, the funds were reportedly funneled to candidates favored by Beijing via Taiwanese businesspeople with operations in China.

Additionally, influential community members are said to have been offered all-expenses-paid visits to China in return for assistance in helping select candidates win the elections. Two underground money exchanges, suspected of playing a role in the illegal money transfers to political campaigns, have been raided by law enforcement officials.

Besides Taiwanese businesspeople acting as mules, there also is a high likelihood that organized crime with ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are recycling some of the proceeds from their criminal activities to boost certain candidates’ campaigns or provide the funds for vote-buying. Moreover, what I have termed “dual use” Chinese firms — i.e., companies with both legitimate business activities and a political mandate — established in Taiwan could also be used to transfer funds directly from China to various candidates in the Taiwan elections.

Most of the funds are believed to come from the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO). Candidates favored by Beijing are allegedly from the “blue” and “green” camp, with a substantial number of them likely to be independents (we should be careful not to overestimate the number of people in the “green” camp who, as pro-CCP groups like the China Unification Promotion Party have claimed, are secret collaborators of China, as much of this could be propaganda meant to fuel paranoia within the Democratic Progressive Party).

The MJIB says it has already identified certain candidates and is building cases against them.

MJIB Director-General Leu Wen-jong.

Such attempts at interference in Taiwan’s elections have occurred in the past. However, with the CCP’s loss of faith in the Kuomintang’s (KMT) ability to act as a proxy for unification, the dynamic is now different. Deference to, and the primacy of, the KMT is no more: the relationship is now directly between the CCP and select candidates, whom it regards as “little brothers.”

There is also mounting evidence that Chinese hackers (“50 centers”) and agents of disinformation are using the November elections in Kaohsiung as a testing ground in preparation for a similar offensive to interfere with the 2020 presidential elections. The election campaign in the southern port city has already involved massive disinformation using accounts with IP addresses in Singapore, Venezuela and elsewhere, which raises the possibility that zombie accounts are being utilized.

By interfering in Taiwan’s elections, Beijing ostensibly has two key objectives in mind. The first, and most obvious one, is to distort democratic processes through vote-buying and by giving unfair advantage to candidates who are either pro-Beijing or highly critical of the Tsai Ing-wen administration. If elected, those candidates would likely become complicit in ongoing efforts by Beijing to bypass central government institutions in Taiwan.

The second aim is more devious but could be just as harmful to Taiwan. Its success will be contingent on how investigators and prosecutors handle this delicate situation. To put it simply, both the pro-Beijing camp and a not-always entirely loyal opposition could use investigations targeting certain candidates — and their potential disqualification from the elections — as “proof” that the Tsai government is using state institutions to meddle with the elections. Through this, and with a sustained disinformation (“fake news”) campaign, Beijing could attempt to cast doubt not only on the outcome of the elections, but, even more damaging, the entire democratic process itself. If people lose faith in the mechanisms and legitimacy of elections, democracy could be derailed. (Much like propagandists who seek to create a world where the objective truth no longer exists and where everything is questionable, a campaign that successfully discredits electoral processes could sow enough doubt that the public come to believe that all elections are a sham.)

We should never forget that, underpinning much of Beijing’s political warfare and propaganda efforts against Taiwan is the goal of undermining the effectiveness of, and belief in, Taiwan’s democratic institutions. The democratic firewall is the problem, as it prevents outcomes that are sought by Beijing. Thus, even if Beijing’s favored candidates did not win in November, China could still “win” by striking a blow against Taiwan’s democracy, and hope to continue its erosion until such a time where democracy no longer stands in the way.

We should never forget that, underpinning much of Beijing’s political warfare and propaganda efforts against Taiwan is the goal of undermining the effectiveness of, and belief in, Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

Facing this double challenge, Taiwanese authorities will need to act with great caution and transparency. If an investigation gathers sufficient evidence to prove that a candidate has been receiving illegal funding from the Chinese government, that evidence will have to be made public and convincingly explained so that no doubt remains that the activities constituted a breach of the law. What the public will need is unassailable proof, otherwise it will be easy for agents of disinformation (in China and Taiwan), as well as members of the opposition, to portray this as improper use of state resources by the Tsai government.

Additionally, the evidence against a candidate must be released before the Nov. 24 elections. This is to avoid a situation where an elected candidate faces charges of illegal funding, and the prospect of the election results being annulled, after the votes have been counted. After-the-fact revelations would inflame political passions and lead to accusations that the government does not respect democratic outcomes. It would also give more ammunition to those who seek to hurt Taiwan’s democracy. The stakes, and the potential damage, would be especially high in large municipalities (e.g., Taipei), where the China angle has already become a source of contention in the elections.

For the November elections, vote buying is no longer the purely local problem it once was. It is now directly tied to Beijing’s sustained assault on the very legitimacy of Taiwan’s democracy.

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